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Abstract   
Does trust play a significant role in the appreciation of art? If so, how does it operate?  
We argue that it does, and that the mechanics of trust operate both at a general and a 
particular level.  After outlining the general notion of ‘art-trust’—the notion sketched 
is consistent with most notions of trust on the market—and considering certain 
objections to the model proposed, we consider specific examples to show in some 
detail that the experience of works of art, and the attribution of art-relevant properties 
or characterisations to works of art, very often involves the notion of trust; in such 
cases—perhaps most or even, implicitly, all—the question ‘Do I trust the artist (or art-




Art is a social activity. Paradigmatically, artists present their work to audiences, and 
audiences engage works of art specifically as creations of certain artists.  Art is often used to 
mediate and navigate complex social relations. This is to say that art typically involves, at 
least implicitly, how we relate to each other. Social relations in turn are mediated by trust. 
Recent work in the epistemology of testimony has taken trust to illuminate how people 
interact and gain knowledge from each other (for prime examples see Faulkner 2011 and 
Hawley 2019).  In this paper, we render a similar analysis to art appreciation. This will 
provide a novel and enriched understanding of art as a social phenomenon. 
Just as there is moral trust and testimonial trust, so too is there trust that is particularly 
relevant to art and art appreciation.  In this paper, we will articulate and defend an account of 
just that trust that is relevant to art and art appreciation, which we call art-trust.  We will rely 
on the reader’s general understanding of the terms ‘art appreciation’ and ‘art evaluation’, not 
define them. We will demonstrate that not only does art-trust fit comfortably within the 
standard way of formulating accounts of trust, but that it helps to make sense of certain 
intuitions concerning the evaluation and appreciation of popular and industrially-produced 
art, as well as those of more traditional art.  Our plan for this paper is to begin with a basic 
account of trust, develop it into an account of art-trust, and demonstrate how it can be applied 
to artistic evaluation and appreciation. We begin by articulating our account of art-trust, and 
addressing prima facie concerns about the appropriateness of the account. The next section 
takes this account and shows how it may be applied in aesthetic evaluation and appreciation. 
We use this section to build towards an articulation of artistic clarity, which we take to be a 
notable way that trust influences a work’s artistic value. In the final section, we connect trust 
with aesthetic experience and show how this provides a further avenue for a work’s 
trustworthiness and its effect on the epistemology of aesthetic properties, and potentially on 
the status of aesthetic properties themselves. 
We do not pretend to prove that it is indeed the language of trust—rather than the 
simpler language of belief, for example—that is the right way to characterise the sorts of 
examples we discuss.  We think rather that thought through with care, the language of trust is 
the best way to make sense of such examples, that the language of trust is warranted or 
justified.  
©2021 Daniel Abrahams & Gary Kemp. Do not quote or cite this version.  
2 
 
With a certain exception to be referred to in due course, our topic has not in general 
been written about; we recognise that we are perhaps pushing on an open door.  Nevertheless, 
we think that once certain questions are posed—especially that of how specifically trust 
enters in to the appreciation of art—there are important non-trivial choices to be made, 
certain clarificatory tasks to be undertaken.  The language of trust, made suitably precise, has 
a much wider range of application in art than one might initially suppose.  Doing so, if we are 
not mistaken, will deepen and expand our philosophical understanding of the value of art. As 
we said at the outset, art is a social activity; our interest in the trust-dimension of art is 





2: ESTABLISHING ART-TRUST 
This section provides a basic account of trust, and begins to connect trust to art practice. It 
will accomplish three things. First, it will offer a brief survey of accounts of trust and 
establish that the focus of this paper is normatively-loaded trust (sometimes called affective 
trust), as opposed to predictive trust (sometimes called mere reliance). Second, it will use the 
basic account of trust to scaffold the basic framework of art-trust which will be used through 
the rest of the paper. Third, and last, it will consider two initial objections. 
 
2.1 Trust: The Basic Account 
Trust is standardly understood in terms of places: the truster (first place) trusts the trustee 
(second place) with respect to some domain (third place). Some trust is normatively-loaded. 
This normatively-loaded trust is usually understood in its breach: if the trustee fails to meet 
the truster’s trust, then the truster might rightly feel betrayed or otherwise entitled to redress 
(Baier 1986: 235). Karen Jones (2017) suggests the truster’s response of ‘but I was counting 
on you!’ In contrast, people sometimes talk about trusting inanimate objects, like a shelf or a 
computer. If a shelf were to collapse a feeling of disappointment might be apt, but being 
offended at the shelf for collapsing would be misplaced. This sort of trust gets referred to as 
predictive trust, or mere reliance. This paper is interested in normatively-loaded trust. 
Accordingly, when we refer to trust it is always this normatively-loaded kind. We refer to 
predictive trust as mere reliance. 
There are a number of definitions of trust on the market. We remain neutral in this paper, 
and what we argue should fit with all major accounts of trust. Philosophical accounts of trust 
tend to have three main criteria, and we use them to guide the analysis that follows. 
1. Regard: Trust is a way that the truster regards the trustee. Some accounts take this 
regard to be a belief; others take it to be some other attitude.  
2. Reliance: Most accounts hold that for the truster to rely on the trustee is for the truster 
to regard the trustee’s intentions in some optimistic way. Jones (1996: 6) suggests the 
truster is optimistic as to the trustee’s good will, whereas Russell Hardin (2002: 1) 
holds that the truster regards the trustee has having encapsulated the truster’s interests 
into her own. An alternate understanding is provided by Katherine Hawley (2019: 9), 
where reliance involves acting as if the trustee will meet some commitment. 
3. Normativity: This is the criterion that takes trust above mere reliance by including 
something which gives trust normative weight. This is often a kind of reflexivity 
condition where the truster’s reliance provides the trustee with a direct and 
compelling (but not indefeasible) reason to meet that reliance (Jones 2012). In 
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contrast, Hawley (2019) holds trust to involve the belief that the trustee has a 
commitment, and it is that commitment which lends the trust its normative weight. 
2.2 Normativity in the Art Context 
In art appreciation, the audience fills the role of the truster. The audience should be 
understood in the way that audiences are usually understood when discussing meaning and 
communication through reflexive intentions, which is as an appropriate audience. But we will 
sometimes refer to the work directly as a trustee, rather than the work’s maker or its author. 
This is just for simplicity, when the nomenclature of trusting the work seems more natural, 
and when the distinction between work maker and author does not matter for the point at 
issue. The degree to which the normalized audience trusts the work is thus the degree to 
which it is appropriate to trust the work’s author or maker with respect to the domain in 
which the work centrally figures.  
 
2.3 The Art-Trust Framework 
We refer to the trust that is relevant to art appreciation as art-trust. Articulating art-trust 
requires understanding what fills the three places of trust. For this paper we take the first 
place to be filled by the appreciating audience. The role of the trustee, in the second place, is 
filled by someone or some group who may have input into an artwork’s creation (and need 
not be known to the truster, who may refer to trustee merely as ‘The creator of this’). 
Depending on context this may be a work’s author or merely someone with a hand in making 
it.
2
 The phrasing that the second place is filled by someone who may have input is important. 
In section 3.4 we will show that it is possible for the trustworthiness of someone who was 
merely potentially involved in a work’s creation is relevant to that work’s appreciation. 
While a work’s maker and its author may be the same person, they may also come apart. 
Accordingly, it is better to consider work-maker and author as different roles, and distinguish 
between the two as potential trustees.  
There are many domains of art-trust. These domains may be as broad as trusting that 
some object is an intentionally-created work of art, or as narrow as trusting that a feature of a 
possibly-satirical work is underlain by a particular set of ethical convictions. One way of 
understanding domains sorts them into two general categories: competence-related domains 
and character-related domains. Competence-related domains simply have to do with the 
truster trusting the trustee to have the competence to successfully execute whatever the 
trustee is trying to do. Character-related domains are slightly more complicated. These have 
to do with trusting what the trustee is trying to do, or what the trustee is intending. An 
example may elucidate the contrast: in the film Transformers 2: Revenge of the Fallen we 
may trust that the image of Megan Fox poised sexually over a motorcycle is as it is supposed 
to be. Director Michael Bay attempted to create an image of Megan Fox poised sexually over 
a motorcycle and he succeeded. That is competence-related trust. It would be a separate 
question as to whether or not that image was meant to be subversive. One may (or, more 
likely, may not) trust that Bay intended to satirize the intersection of consumerism and the 
male gaze. The truster’s trust concerns what Bay wanted to do, not whether Bay succeeded in 
doing what he wanted to do.  The truster is trusting that Bay had the particular intention of 
being subversive. This is character-related trust.  
                                                     
2
 The language of trust may also be invoked to describe the audience’s attitude towards curators, art-lecturers, 
reviewers, and one’s friends when talking about art; we leave these issues aside because we see this as trusting 
testimony, not as trusting the work; but see Nguyen, forthcoming (15f) for more. 
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The domain of art-trust may be specified in another way. Some trust has to do with 
the form of a work.
3
 In this case the truster trusts that whatever a work is, it is what it is 
supposed to be. In addition to form-related trust is content-related trust. This is trust that is 
concerned with a work’s content, often its meaning. The Transformers example tracks this 
distinction too. The trust that the image of Megan Fox poised sexually over a motorcycle is as 
it is supposed to be, concerns what the filmic image is. The trust over the satire that that 
image putatively conveys concerns that image’s meaning.  
This is an appropriate point at which to outline the main difference between our view 
of art-trust and a recent account given by C. Thi Nguyen (forthcoming).  Nguyen (16) lists 
two other trust-domains—‘aesthetic competence’, which we can accept as aligning with our 
account, and one which he terms ‘aesthetic steadfastness’—but by far the most importance 
for Nguyen is ‘aesthetic sincerity’ (his title is ‘Trust and Sincerity in Art’).  He claims that 
‘our greatest ire is often directed, not at the artist that makes bad art, but at the insincere artist 
— the sellout’ (4); and that ‘trust in aesthetic sincerity is particularly characteristic of 
contemporary aesthetic life’(19).  We have three main objections to these claims, in 
ascending order of importance.   
First, it is perhaps appropriate to trust in the sincerity, say, of a poet, maybe of a solo 
musician, but the idea becomes at best strained when we think of plays, operas, movies, and 
especially works of architecture;  there is often no one we can rightly hold responsible to be 
sincere, even if in many cases it will be surprising to find that, for example, a certain actor 
was not sincere.  Second, insisting on sincerity, although again it will be manifestly 
appropriate in some cases, assumes a certain romanticism, if not a naïve romanticism, about 
one’s relation to the artist or art-maker.
4
 Even if we restrict the claim with Nguyen to 
‘contemporary aesthetic life’, one’s attitude as a modern gallery-goer, concert-audience,  
visitor to works of architecture, or patron of the cinema, is in general much more 
sophisticated, more worldly, more forgiving and perhaps even cynical. One needn’t feel 
betrayed if as it happens a production by Picasso or Tintoretto which passed all one’s other 
aesthetic tests was in fact produced insincerely (whatever that would mean); or if the various 
architects responsible for St. Peter’s were merely cunning. In such cases, the proof really is in 
the pudding, and one is quite prepared to overlook a good deal.  Third, one can make 
distinctions of time and place. If one can think of Duchamp or Warhol, or of Cage and 
Berio,
5
 of Verhoeven and Snyder, that is of artists of more or less our age who are sometimes 
wilfully insincere, one can also think of art outside the realms which invite the idea of the 
sole artist, which can in turn encourage the invocation of aesthetic sincerity.  Our attitude 
towards pre-fifteenth century plastic art is one that is at peace with the thought that many of 
the works may well have been produced ‘insincerely’, for example by a workshop, and very 
much for pecuniary reasons; towards the architecture of the Mayans without dragging in the 
imagined artist for interrogation;  towards recent art from all over the world without feeling 
vulnerable to betrayal if the motivation were a religious and indeed a practical one.  The 
attitudes are our attitudes, part of the contemporary scene.  We’re by no means saying that a 
demand for sincerity is not a significant ingredient for some or even many works, and 
Nguyen does say explicitly that he is characterising only the ‘typical’ attitude, but the attitude 
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 In this paragraph we refer to the form of a work and the content of the work. This distinction is merely meant 
to distinguish between the questions of what a work is and what it means, and we do not want to commit to a 
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4
 In addition, Nguyen verges on an individualistic doctrine: that artists ‘coordinate with each other in the larger 
scheme of things by taking up commitments to largely ignore each others’ needs in daily practice. Artists 
cooperate by pledging to be independent’(forthcoming: 24).   
5
 Nguyen says (forthcoming: 27): ‘… avant-garde artistic communities seem marked by much trust in aesthetic 
sincerity’.  Again, if this is meant to apply to the avant-garde in general, then this seems to us to underestimate 
the capacity, in the case of the avant-garde mind, for flexibility, even for aesthetic immorality.  
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is not so typical of the ‘contemporary scene’ as Nguyen makes out, and the extent to which 
the invocation of trust is appropriate runs far beyond it.  
If sincerity is too narrow as well as misrepresentative of the appropriate normative 
attitudes in many cases, is our view then that the appropriate normative attitudes are too 
general, multifaceted or abstract to be captured with single concept? No. As will emerge 
below, we think that this more sophisticated, flexible and worldly domain of art-trust can 
adequately be summarised as trust in artistic clarity. Our trust operates at a less personal 
level, at a level more squarely concerned with the art-object, and the operation of trust can 
affect the perceived aesthetic content of a work.  We will say much more about this explicitly 
in section 3.5. 
This, then, is the basic story about trust which we will apply through the rest of this 
paper. Art appreciation is, in part, guided by trust. The appreciating audience may trust either 
a work’s maker or its author. There are many domains for trust, but they may be sorted into 
two sets of two: competence-and-character related trust, and form-and-content related trust.  
 
2.4 Prima Facie Problems 
As articulated so far, art-trust has two problems that ought to be addressed. First there is the 
problem that trust, as standardly formulated, is about the trustee’s future action while art 
appreciation is standardly aimed at an already-completed work. Second there is the worry 
that trust, in valuing adherence to norms, will incorrectly disvalue norm-violating artworks. 
We treat the two challenges in turn. 
Accounts of trust standardly present trust as concerned with how the trustee will act. 
For example, Hawley (2019: 9) frames trust as involving the belief that the trustee will meet 
her commitments, whereas Jones (1996: 4) requires that the trustee take the truster’s reliance 
as a direct reason to act as relied upon. Art-trust, by coming at the moment of appreciation, 
seems to come after the trustee has acted. The work is already complete. If the work is 
complete at the time of appreciation, then there is nothing left for the trustee to do when the 
audience comes to rely on them. 
This worry may be answered straightforwardly on two counts. The first is that while 
trust is standardly framed as concerning future action, there is no cost to allow it to concern 
past action as well. Analogous cases may be found in both moral and testimonial trust. We 
may only cross a rope bridge because we trust that our friend has safely affixed the end of the 
rope on the other side of the crossing. Similarly, we may trust the words written by a 19
th
-
Century testifier, even though she is long dead. The second way to address the worry is by 
recalling that art-trust is about a norm-governed practice. Even if a work-maker may not be 
trustworthy by meeting a specific, actually-existing person’s reliance, he may still be 
trustworthy by adhering to artworld norms. In this sense, the artist meets the audience’s 
reliance by creating a work that can be appreciated consonant with standard norms of art 
appreciation. 
This appeal to norms of art appreciation segues to the second worry. An account of 
trust may appeal to norms as we have done, but art is frequently in the business of norm 
violations. Artists do, on occasion, look to startle, confuse, trick, and deceive audiences, and 
artworks are praised for these effects. If this makes a work less trustworthy, then it seems our 
account of artistic trust might wrongly penalize works for what should be aesthetic 
achievements. 
There are two ways to address this worry. The first is that in the case of art, some 
norms are more relevant than others. A work that violates a lower-order commitment (such as 
with respect to genre convention) may still adhere to higher-order conventions (with respect 
to general aesthetic engagement). Accordingly, we can account for works that are better for 
their norm violations by holding that a work that violates a lower-order commitment in the 
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service of a higher-order commitment is good as a transgressive work precisely because the 
lower-order transgression serves the higher-order norm. For example, the film Knives Out 
violates the genre norm of detective stories by not having the detective as the protagonist. 
However, it adheres to higher order norms about a work being for the audience’s enjoyment. 
This is all to say that many norm violations are not so significant as to substantially affect a 
work’s trustworthiness.  It might even be the case that norm violations are expected. A work 
of Avant-garde art, for example, might adhere to higher-order norms about Avant-garde art 
specifically by violating lower-order norms.
6
 
The second and stronger response is simply that a work’s being less trustworthy does 
not necessarily make it an aesthetically worse work. Art appreciation, at least in the sense that 
we are engaging it, is governed by artistic and not ethical norms (or at least: as well as ethical 
norms). This means that a betrayal of trust can be (artistically) good. Sometimes the artist 
really is trying to take advantage of the audience; we find that acceptable. 
In this section we have articulated our basic account of art-trust, and addressed a pair 
of prima facie problems. The next section begins to apply and elaborate this account, 
focusing on examples drawn from film and literature. This section drives towards articulating 
the value of clarity, which we take to be the main way a work’s trustworthiness affects its 
artistic value. 
 
3: TRUST, THE INDUSTRIAL CONTEXT, AND CLARITY 
Thus far we have provided a basic account of art-trust. In this section we begin to elaborate 
that account in two ways. First we will apply our account to two basic questions of art 
appreciation: What is the work and what does it mean? This will help demonstrate how the 
account functions. Second, we will show how the account makes sense of works with 
multiple or ambiguous authors. In particular, we will show that the art-trust account is helpful 
for understanding certain aspects of industrially-produced works, like a weekly television 
show or a major studio movie. This section concludes with a point about the artistic value of 
clarity, which we take to be the main way that a work’s trustworthiness is manifested in a 
work’s artistic value. 
 
3.1 Basic Application: What Is the Work? 
Let us begin with how trust is relevant to art appreciation when what is in question is 
understanding what the work is. This is usually going to be trust that takes the work’s maker 
(rather than its author) as the trustee, and artistic form as the domain. Trust of this sort 
concerns whether or not some object is (or is part of) an art object which is a possible subject 
for appreciation. If the object is not a work of art (or part of one), then it is inapt as a subject 
for appreciation. 
Universal to definitions of art is that a work of art must, in some way, be intentionally 
created. This intentional creation may range from constructing an object from scratch to 
simply putting forward a found object for artistic appreciation. Accordingly, part of an 
audience engaging a work of art is trusting that the object before them has in fact been put 
forward as a candidate for appreciation. The trust inheres in the audience relying upon the 
artist to have created the work in front of them. Most of the time this is a simple affair. Works 
are presented in institutional contexts like museums or theatres where attention is clearly 
drawn to the object as a candidate for appreciation. However, there are more complicated 
cases where the role of trust is more relevant. Consider the two following cases. 
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Glove: Someone drops their glove at the Museum of Modern Art. The audience 
cannot tell whether or not this is a work of art. 
Boom Mic: In one scene in a film, the boom mic is clearly visible. 
 
In both cases, there is ambiguity as to what is or is not a candidate for appreciation. The 
glove in glove may be nothing more than a glove, but it is also not impossible that it is a work 
of art. It is, after all, located in a museum of modern art. Accordingly, when the audience 
engages it as a potential work, the question they ask is whether or not it is intentionally 
presented as a candidate for appreciation. Engaging the glove as a work of art requires 
trusting that it was in fact put forward as a candidate for appreciation.
7
  
Similar to Glove, Boom Mic interrogates whether part of an object is an intentional 
part of a work. Usually, a piece of technical equipment being visible in a film shot is an error. 
However, there are some film approaches such as that of Lars Von Trier’s Dogme 95 project 
which make a point of having low production values. In such a case, the visibility of the 
boom mic might not be a mistake, but rather an intentional feature of the film.  
In both cases, such that the audience is trusting that what is in front of them is 
supposed to be a candidate for appreciation, the domain of trust is the work maker’s 
competence. They are trusting that the work maker was able to successfully achieve whatever 
she was trying to accomplish. 
 
3.2 Basic Application: What Does it Mean? 
The art-trust account is also useful as an approach to work meaning. When applied to work 
meaning, art-trust takes the author as the trustee. Since most accounts of work-meaning in 
analytic philosophy make use of a Gricean-style framework this kind of trust will also take a 
character-centred domain, usually the author’s intentions. This Gricean framework is, 
roughly, that works of art possess non-natural meaning which is encoded or otherwise 
embodied in the work and retrieved by the audience through a process of reflexive intentions.  
Analytic philosophy offers a range of approaches to work-meaning and author’s 
intentions.  These approaches may be thought of as ranging from strong forms of 
intentionalism, which take the meaning of a work to be what the actual author intended, to 
forms of anti-intentionalism which hold that meaning is just what the audience reconstructs, 
with approaches in between which make use of implied or hypothetical authors. We think 
that with a certain exception which we will come to shortly, the account can be adapted to 
these alternatives. We address each in turn, and show for each what fills the roll of trustee in 
our account of art-trust. 
Strong intentionalist accounts that make use of real authors may be accounted for 
straightforwardly. The trustee is the real person who is the author, and the domain of trust is 
their intentions. The audience trusts the author such that they appreciate a work of art on the 
basis of the author having particular meaning-relevant intentions. This is not about whether 
an action is intentional, but what the intention is. Consider Zack Snyder’s Man of Steel. If one 
is to interpret the work as allegorizing Superman to Jesus Christ, part of what is necessary is 
to trust that Snyder intended for Superman to be a Christ allegory.  
Not all intentionalist accounts of work meaning make use of the real author. Some use 
inference to attribute intentions to a fictional author. In these cases, it must be explained how 
art-trust works without the trustee actually existing. We argue that the approach of trust still 
holds. While the audience does not attribute intentions to an actual person, they may still rely 
upon the fictional author. In the Hawleyian sense of rely, this is straightforward: the audience 
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appreciates the work on the belief that the fictional author has the relevant meaning-making 
intentions. In Jones’ attitudinal sense of ‘reliance’ the process is also straightforward. The 
attitude is simply directed towards the fictional author, rather than a real one. 
Anti-intentionalist approaches supply a slightly stronger challenge. Under anti-
intentionalist approaches there may be no author, real or fictional, to whom intentions may be 
attributed. If the intentions are the relevant domain of trust, as we have suggested, then there 
is no trust to be had. We suggest that in this case, the proper domain of trust is whatever 
inputs are necessary to create meaning in a work, and the proper trustee is whatever the 
source of those inputs may be. Consider again the Man of Steel example. The audience may 
justify the Superman-as-Christ allegory by appealing to the fact that the film was produced in 
a Christian society which has a prominent story about a chosen son being sent to earth to 
sacrifice himself for their moral benefit. Accordingly, the audience may trust that the 
Christological elements of the story reflect the Christian society.  
It may be countered that this sort of trust is at best reliance and cannot be 
normatively-loaded trust. The outputs of society can only be understood mechanistically and 
whatever broad, abstract process connects the Christian values of society to the Christological 
themes of the film cannot be appropriately motivated or committed in the way that 
normatively-loaded trust requires. We believe we can accept this point at little cost. It may be 
that in the particular context of anti-intentionalist interpretation of work-meaning, the 
interpretive process does not make use of normatively-loaded trust. Since this is still a trust-
like process, and since the rest of our analysis of art-trust is unaffected, we believe we can 
accede and continue. We add that if radical anti-intentionalism is being contemplated—such 
as views associated with Barthes (1978a, 1978b) or Derrida (1978)—then evidently the view 
cannot be made consistent with our view of art and trust; we find that to be an acceptable 
implication. 
 
3.3 A Finer Point About Intentions 
We have so far talked about competence-centred trust and character-centred trust separately. 
However, they can intersect in an interesting way. Specifically, it is possible for the audience 
to trust the competence of the author’s intentions. Return to the Transformers 2 example. The 
audience may rightly interpret Bay to be intending a subversive point about the male gaze. 
However, the audience may also worry that Bay’s conception of femaleness or femininity is 
such that Bay fails to have the work express that subversive point. In this sense, he is 
incompetent in his intentions: he has failed in his attempt to intend an anti-sexist point.  
This sort of trust is particularly relevant in cases of ethically dubious humour 
(Abrahams 2020).
8
 There is humour that stands or falls based on the attitudes it manifests 
towards marginalized groups. Some humour putatively manifests a positive attitude towards 
its marginalized targets. However, the humourist may have a negative conception of the 
marginalized group in question. Consider a Jewish joke that trades heavily on anti-Semitic 
caricatures. The audience may trust that the humourist intends well towards Jews, but they 
may distrust how the humourist thinks of Jews generally. They may worry that the humourist 
believes the anti-Semitic caricatures employed are accurate. The ethical content of the 
humour is dubious: its goodness and badness are under doubt. In such a case, the humour is 
ethically dubious, at least in part, because the audience cannot fully trust the competence of 
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the humourist’s intentions. Insofar as works of art contain representations of marginalized 
groups, this argument applies to art as it does to humour. 
 
3.4 More Trustees and Known Unknowns 
So far we have discussed trust with a singular trustee. However, the production of art works 
need not have only one work maker, or only one author. Especially at industrial scale, the 
process of assembling a work of art may require that work to pass through many hands. 
Similarly, a work may have multiple authors if the work permits multiple authorship.
9
 This 
does not pose a challenge to art-trust — there is nothing special about differently trusting 
different individuals in a group, nor about trust directed at groups — but it does identify 
something interesting about trustworthiness in art-trust. 
Art works produced in an industrial context may include the input of all sorts of 
people, including those who do not occupy what are conventionally thought of as artistic 
roles. Consider the studio head in the film For Your Consideration, who changes the fictional 
film Home for Purim to Home for Thanksgiving because Thanksgiving holds more universal 
appeal. As this example also suggests, decisions from managers are also much more likely to 
be motivated by non-artistic considerations, such as cost, marketing, and product placement. 
There are also inputs from organizations like the American military, who allow the use of 
military technology on the grounds that they approve how both that technology and the 
military more broadly is depicted. Whether or not there is any role that managers, patrons, 
and sponsors should have in the art-making process, the fact is that they are involved in the 
industrial art-making process. The ways in which they may be involved give them a 
particular place within our account of art-trust. 
We want to draw attention to the financial considerations which animate managerial 
decisions, for this has direct effects on the ways in which art-trust comes into play. For 
industrially-produced art, these concerns are systemic. The production of, e.g., films are often 
approved on the basis of their profitability, and production houses make decisions based on 
maximizing that profitability. Pointedly, the role of managers who affect a work’s production 
are generally obscure to the audience, and so these managers constitute a kind of known 
unknown. It may be understood that there are managers who may direct a work’s production 
on economic grounds, but it is obscure who these people are and whether they have in fact 
intervened. This has two implications for art-trust. The first is that the trustworthiness of such 
managers is relevant even if they did not actually intervene in a work’s production.  To the 
extent that the appreciative process involves considering the candidate intentions behind a 
work — both whether some feature of that work is intentional and what the making intentions 
were — the managers’ intentions must be considered. The second implication is that the 
industrial process forms a pall hanging over the trustworthiness of all works which that 
process produces. The managers and their conventionally non-artistic concerns are 
inextricable from the industrial process. Such that the merely potential input of managers is 
relevant to the appreciation of industrially-produced works, the appreciation of all 
industrially-produced works will be affected by managers’ trustworthiness.  
Notice that the demand of trustworthiness is indeed, in the ways outlined, a demand 
not to ‘sell-out’ in Nguyen’s sense but it is not, positively speaking, simply a demand for 
sincerity.  That may be involved, but many other aesthetically-relevant properties may also be 
involved, such as commitment to the film, respect for the actors and audience, belief and 
respect for the genre of the film; and more generally and fundamentally, the overarching 
clarity of the film.  Which is our next topic.   
 
                                                     
9
 For example, see Gaut (1997) on how film cannot be understood without appealing to multiple authorship. 
©2021 Daniel Abrahams & Gary Kemp. Do not quote or cite this version.  
10 
 
3.5 Clarity as the Focus of Trustworthiness 
If trust and trustworthiness is as much a part of artistic appreciation as our account suggests, 
then there should be some way to account for it in appraisals of artistic value. However, 
straightforwardly evaluating a work as better for being trustworthy seems inapt; ‘trust’ does 
not intuitively fit on a list of Sibleyan evaluative terms next to ‘unified’ or ‘dynamic.’  
We spoke earlier of various domains of art-trust.  But there is, we submit, an 
overarching value that knits these other domains together:  We suggest that a work’s 
trustworthiness in general is positively correlated with its degree of clarity—where a work’s 
clarity may require a great deal of time, effort and hard-won skill to be revealed to a 
spectator.  (To revert to a basic distinction introduced above, clarity is obviously competence-
related but is also character-related, for judgements of the clarity of a work are not without 
implications for other works by the artist, which in turn involves the artist’s character; we’ll 
take up this point below.)  We can sensibly ask of each subsidiary domain ‘Why is this 
important?’, but it will tend to end the conversation if it is explained in answer that the works 
clarity is at stake.  A work is clear insofar as its artistic features are—in principle—accessible 
by the audience, and are accessible in the appropriate way and to the appropriate degree as 
intended by the author or work-maker. Thus if one’s attitude is justifiably one of trust, one 
can justifiably expend extra effort in coming to terms with a work that initially seems 
unclear. A trustworthy work will usually be a clearer work, and a less trustworthy work will 
usually be less clear. It is not logically impossible that an untrustworthy work should be 
clear—a case of artistic luck, perhaps; nor that an unclear work should be trustworthy—a 
case where a master fails, perhaps; but we take it that such cases are anomalous.  
A failure of trustworthiness on the part of the work may harm the work in either of 
two ways. The first is simply that a lack of trustworthiness on the part of the work renders 
engagement more difficult in general. The audience may be repelled from fully committing to 
the work because they have to second-guess what they are appreciating—and as will emerge 
in a moment, may tend to be repelled from committing to other works by the same maker or 
makers. The second is that cognitive value is harmed because the lack of trustworthiness 
obscures any point the work might be making.  Returning again to the Transformers 2 
example with the sexualized image of Megan Fox, accepting a critical or anti-sexist point 
from the image of Megan Fox on a motorcycle is hindered if the audience cannot trust the 
artistically-relevant source to be making that point.  In either case, the failure is normatively 
valenced, since the work demands time and energy and therefore incurs debt; one may rightly 
feel ripped-off, if only mildly.   
If a work may be less clear and worse for being less trustworthy, then, given our 
account of trustworthiness and industrial production, industrially produced works face a 
penalty for being industrially produced.  Industrially produced works are in general less 
trustworthy, and are therefore, in general, less clear. This may sound like a bold 
proclamation, but we believe it is already common to how much popular art is discussed. 
This is captured in the way that independently-produced works are valued over industrially-
produced works, and the concerns over an artist ‘selling out.’  
 
3.6 Unclear but Successful Works?  
We have touched on this objection before—the ‘second worry’ of section 2.5—but now with 
clarity advanced as our sine qua non of art-trust we can consider a narrower point that may 
seem correspondingly sharper.  Some works are purposefully unclear about their content, as 
when a horror film’s murkiness obscures the approaching killer. What might be called an 
‘ambiguous’ work of art may be evaluatively clear by its being clear that it is supposed to be 
ambiguous, and it is supposed to be ambiguous to the degree that it is. Furthermore, many 
works—for example Beckett’s Endgame—merit very different interpretations, and not only 
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are none the worse for it, the aesthetic merit of such works seems to be enhanced by their 
multi-interpretability.  One might go so far as to say that in these cases, it is the work’s very 
lack of clarity that makes it into a masterpiece.  Are these not counterexamples to our claim 
that aesthetic clarity is the over-arching domain of art-trust?   
Two things.  First—less significantly, and this is implicit in the two paragraphs 
closing the last section—there are many factors involved in the status of a work as a 
masterpiece.  Failure on one measure, even an important one such as clarity, is consistent 
with its overall success (for example, the end of Shostakovich’s Fifth Symphony: many find 
it hollow, mocking, and others do not; but it is generally agreed that the Fifth is a great work).  
Second—more significantly—the intentions, perhaps the unconscious or implicit intentions, 
may be precisely to pose the questions that arise in the interpretation of the work.  The ending 
of Shostakovich’s Fifth Symphony may again be cited. Beckett, insofar as he had determinate 
intentions in whatever sense, may have intended to ask questions rather than answer them.  
The clarity of Endgame lies at least partly in the force and urgency with which its questions 
are posed.    
 
3.7 A Worry: Too Much Trust 
The story we have given of art-trust provides a large role for trust, and there is the worry that 
we have given trust too much of a role. The account we have provided, especially in sections 
3.1 and 3.2, makes trust seem almost fundamental to the process of art appreciation. Trust 
being so fundamental to art appreciation, the worry may go, effectively adds an extra step to 
art appreciation and such an extra step is counterintuitive. 
We believe this worry may be deflected easily enough. Trust plays a similarly 
fundamental role in some theories of testimony (Hinchman 2005, Faulkner 2011). We are 
confident that trust in art appreciation is no more burdensome than trust in common 
conversational exchange. Accordingly, to the extent that trust is plausible as an inescapable 
part of believing testimony, trust is also plausible as part of the process of art appreciation.  
 
4. ART-TRUST AND THE APPRECIATION OF AESTHETIC QUALITIES 
For our final topic we shall examine more specifically the role of trust with respect to non-
literary or non-narrative arts, taking examples from music and painting.  The manner in 
which trust enters into the spectator’s experience is we think enlightening and has further 
substantive implications.   
Such arts primarily appeal to perception, but obviously trustworthiness is not a 
‘perceptually distinguishable’ category in Walton’s sense (1970: 337-339).  The beliefs on 
which trust is in general based are not normally perceptual, and so it is with aesthetic 
trust.  The way trust enters into the spectator’s response is rather by influencing the response, 
which will in many cases influence one’s beliefs founded on perception.  Following Walton, 
the point comprises a Psychological Thesis and a Normative Thesis.  The former is simply 
the point, adapted to our subject, that the experience of a work as having such-and-such 
aesthetic properties, will in point of fact depend on the extent that the spectator trusts the art-
maker, whether explicitly or, what will typically be the case, implicitly (343).  The latter is a 
corollary of Walton’s more general claim that ‘at least in some cases, it is correct to perceive 
a work in certain categories’ (356; emphasis ours): The relevant category is nothing so 
sweeping as the Categories of Art which interest Walton, but simply the category where the 
artist did have those aptitudes and intentions which, when successfully realised, qualify him 
or her as bearing out the relevant type of trust.  The latter is a truth-maker for the hypothesis, 
as it were, ventured under the former.  
It follows that an aesthetic judgement as far as its psychological aspect vis-à-vis trust 
is concerned can in certain cases be fully justified—the attribution may be made based on 
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sound perception and on other sources of information about the work—yet the Normative 
aspect of trust fail.  One is betrayed.  This is interesting, but is not so upsetting to one’s 
judgement in such a case because the trust dimension, should it fail, needn’t be the be-all and 
end-all of aesthetic engagement with a work of art; one can be merely amused, or at worse 
chagrined, to find that one has been taken for a ride.  
Nevertheless, the case of justified-but-non-veridical cases of aesthetic trust are, as we 
said, interesting.  One important reason is that if it is true, as people such as Walton and 
Wollheim believe, that the experience of a work of art is typically not atomistic—that the 
fully justified experience of a single work of art always or often requires experience of other 
works of the artist's oeuvre—is that one requires trust (not moral trust, though that can enter 
in), and in particular aesthetic trust, which one grants to an artist in virtue of one's awareness 
of his or her other works, of the artist's (deserved) reputation, or both.
10
   
Two examples will help, the first of a jazz solo.  Sonny Rollins improvises a simple 
phrase, at the beginning of his solo.  One is well-aware of Rollins’ reputation.  In another 
context, a very mediocre player who is known as such plays the exact same phrase, 
improvising on the same tune as Rollins was.  In the Rollins case, one justifiably expects that 
Rollins will go on to use the phrase in the construction of a solo that is coherent, inventive, 
and passionate.  One sits up in one's seat.  Not so of the mediocre player's notes; it will 
typically lead, as one knows only too well, only to another derivative, indecisive and 
shapeless solo.  Unlike the case of the mediocre player, one ‘has confidence' in Rollins’ 
abilities, one places trust in them—where the attitude is not merely belief, for one has 
something riding on it:  One finds it worthwhile to invest one's attention, indeed is willing to 
risk one’s reputation as a listener (if that is not too grand a characterisation), because one 
trusts.  The situation does not change categorically if, in a one-in-a-million chance 
occurrence, the mediocre player keeps it up for the two minutes it takes him to play his 
solo.  Perhaps he just got lucky, but the solo he played was indistinguishable from a solo by 
Rollins.  Our hunch is that the continued feeling of guardedness, which it would natural for a 
clued-in spectator to feel, would be justified.  The mediocre player’s solo, as good as it was—
and as clear as it was—and one’s experience of the solo, suffers from its not being fully 
trustworthy.  Indeed one’s experience of just that phrase can justifiably be different, for same 
reasons.   
The same sort of thing happens with the plastic arts.  Take the Danto-esque situation 
of two perceptually indistinguishable paintings, one by Paul Klee and the other by some 
execrable daubist (Danto 1964).  One's knowledge that the piece is by Klee will encourage 
one to dwell upon the painting, looking for subtle virtues such as harmony and balance. If 
one knows that the piece is by the daubist, that it is a random high point in an otherwise 
eminently forgettable output, one would be justified in passing it over comparatively 
quickly.  One trusts Klee, but not the other.  The point is not immediately that the two 
pictures have different aesthetic properties (although perhaps they do; see just above and 
immediately below), but that the degree of trust plays a legitimate motivational role in the 
aesthetic experience of the two pictures. And again, the language of belief does not suffice, as 
a gallery-goer’s time and energy must factor in.  
At least one of us is inclined to accept that the right attribution of artistic value and 
that of aesthetic properties are indeed holistic.  The stopped-clock achievement of the 
mediocre tenor and of the execrable daubist has in fact less aesthetic value than Rollins’ solo 
or Klee’s portrait, and the aesthetic properties differ correspondingly. It is partly because of 
the operation of trust as just described, and partly because certain expressive properties are 
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such that one simply cannot be justified in their attribution without seeing similar phenomena 
in other examples from a given artist’s output (Wollheim has made a meticulous case for this 
in extended discussions of Manet and Ingres in his 1987: 232-43, 249-75).   
But as indicated two paragraphs ago we are not here assuming holism of this 
kind.  Nor are we asserting that aesthetic trust is always necessary or sufficient for a 
defensible or ‘correct’ experience of a given work. We are not saying that aesthetic 
trustworthiness is itself an aesthetic property.  What we are saying is that the dynamics of 
trust—perhaps merely implicitly—typically, if not in every case, plays an indispensable role 
in justifying one's confidence in the attribution of aesthetic properties and aesthetic value.  If 
one cannot trust, then one might well have other ways of justifying one's experience.  Yet 
where it is forthcoming, trust legitimately assists one in having a justified aesthetic 
experience of the work of art.  We take the Psychological Thesis to be simple and intuitive, 
and established.  As a Normative Thesis, as a thesis about the justification of the attribution 
of aesthetic properties and value to works of art, the thesis is that trust can legitimately be 
appealed to for such attributions.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
We have provided a novel account of art appreciation, where the understanding and 
enjoyment of a work of art is mediated by the attitude of trust. Trust may be directed towards 
either a work’s maker or its author, and may concern what a work of art is, what it means, 
what is the competence of its maker, or what is the character of its author. Accepting that 
trust may be involved in art appreciation in this way helps elucidate intuitions for example 
about valuing a work’s clarity, the effects of industrial production on artistic meaning and 
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